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Reply to “Democracy, Participation, and
Information: Complementarity Between
Political and Economic Institutions”

CHRISTOPHER WONNELL*

As I see it, Thomas Christiano’s Article on democracy and complementarity
has two purposes.1 One is to defend democracy against the charge that it
cannot work because of the rational ignorance of the citizenry. The other
is to propose a way of making democracy work better by changing the
economic system in such a way as to give workers access to more of the
information they need to become informed voters.
Let us start with the first half of the argument on the utility of democracy
as a system of governance. The problem Christiano identifies is that
democracy seems to call upon the masses to become well enough informed
to make important policy decisions.2 But, surveys show that the public is
shockingly uninformed on the most basic matters of government.3 Moreover,
*
© 2019 Christopher Wonnell. Professor of Law, University of San Diego School
of Law.
1. See generally Thomas Christiano, Democracy, Participation, and Information:
Complementarity Between Political and Economic Institutions, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 935
(2019).
2. Id. at 938.
3. The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior: General Interest
in Public Affairs 1960–2008, AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUD., https://electionstudies.org/
resources/anes-guide/top-tables/?id=84 [https://perma.cc/JEJ6-MYJS] (identifying that
since 1960, most Americans claim to only be interested in public affairs “some of the
time”); The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior: Which Party Had Most
Members of Congress Before the Election 1958–2016, AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUD.,
https://electionstudies.org/resources/anes-guide/top-tables/?id=19 [https://perma.cc/BHS3-957P]
(displaying the inconsistency of Americans correctly identifying which party had the most
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economic theory, as propounded by Anthony Downs and others, suggests
that such ignorance is quite rational.4 The chances that you will change
the outcome of an election with your vote are minuscule, so the time you
would spend on becoming an informed voter is not rationally calculated
to change outcomes.
Now Christiano comes to the defense of democracy. He first observes
that democratic governments usually produce pretty good outcomes.5
Democracies do not let their people starve, they rarely go to war with each
other, they do a decent job of fighting off pollution, their economies generally
grow at a reasonable rate, and so on.6 Moreover, outcomes are better for
particular groups when they are allowed to vote than when they are not.
Women have gotten a better shake in the economy since they received the
vote. Blacks used the franchise to fight against lynching and segregation.
Workers used their political power to promote progressive legislation,
such as social insurance. Of course, democracy can at times seem like quite
a carnival, but one looks around the world at right and left wing tyrannies,
hereditary monarchies, failed or anarchic states, and theocracies, and one
almost always comes back to Churchill’s observation that democracy is
the worst form of government except for the others.7
The question is how to reconcile this reasonably good performance with
the theory of rational ignorance that would seem to predict far worse results.
I believe that Christiano has asked the right question here, and I also believe
that he offers the right answer. The problem is that he also offers a couple
of wrong answers.
The answer I like is that people do not need to be good reasoners on
matters of technique in order to be sensible voters or sensible decision makers,
generally.8 For example, people get by in the marketplace, without much
knowledge of how to produce good products, by relying on proxies such
as brand names and personal reputation that have proven successful in the
past. Similarly, they get by in the political world by being able to tell when
things are not going particularly well and, in such cases, by seeking to

members of Congress before the election between 1958 and 2016); Americans Know
Surprisingly Little About Their Government, Survey Finds, ANNENBURG PUB. POL’Y CTR.
U. PA. (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-knowsurprisingly-little-about-their-government-survey-finds/ [https://perma.cc/CS56-9YCT].
4. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 243–45,
253–57 (1957); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 348–69 (1989).
5. See Christiano, supra note 1, at 938.
6. Id. at 941.
7. 444 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1947) col. 207 (UK) (“No one pretends that
democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form
of Government except all the others that have been tried from time to time . . . .”).
8. See Christiano, supra note 1, at 953.
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replace one set of elites with another. In our system, the political parties
are important institutions that represent coalitions of elites who purport to
have the expertise to produce good outcomes, and the public judges those
institutions by their results in much the same way that consumers judge
products.
Now it should be acknowledged what a seriously imperfect proxy for
actual knowledge these institutions are. For example, there is ample
reason to believe that the business cycle operates on its own dynamic, and
upturns and downturns of the economy are not usually caused by the
immediate policies of the party that happens to be in power at the time.
The same can probably be said for many wars and other catastrophes. The
party in power gets blamed for them but may just be unlucky in being in
the wrong place at the wrong time. The public can vote a good party out
of power or keep a bad party in power for too long as a result of these lags
and coincidences. But in the long run, the tendency of bad policies to
produce bad outcomes should become pretty evident to the public, and
even if does not, that tendency is likely to become evident to the elites of
both parties, who may very well sell themselves by their old policies while
secretly implementing new ones in which they have more confidence.
And then there are the bad answers that Christiano offers on the question
of why democracy produces better results than rational ignorance theory
would predict.9 One answer he proposes is that people are often altruistic
in matters of politics, but it is not clear how this helps with the rational
ignorance problem.10 Like egoists, altruists should rationally understand
that their chance of promoting an altruistic purpose by becoming wellinformed voters on public policy matters is trivial. Altruists will be tempted
to settle on the policy that, with the smallest investment in knowledge, seems
most likely to promote their altruistic purpose. But we know by now that
the policy that screams out the good will of the altruist often is not, indeed
I would say usually is not, the policy that actually promotes the welfare of
others, once subtle and indirect effects are considered. And, if anything,
altruists seem less likely to learn from their mistakes than greedy people
because greedy people really do want to embrace the policy that works,
while altruists may have a psychological attachment to the policies they
promoted in the past, being an important aspect of their favorable selfimage.
9.
10.

See id. at 937–38.
Id. at 939.
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The other answer that Christiano offers is that many people are, in fact,
well informed, especially the wealthy and the educated.11 So perhaps
democracy works pretty well because these middle and upper classes
are informed, and it could work even better from the perspective of power
equality if the workers were as informed as the middle and upper classes
are. This feeds into Christiano’s proposals for reform. He argues that the
well educated and well connected become politically informed, essentially
for free, as an indirect result of their jobs and social connections and the tests
they had to pass in school.12 He wants something similar for the workers.13
If they could participate in union affairs, they would pick up political wisdom
as a side effect of their economic activities. And perhaps they could pick up
even more political wisdom by more far-reaching economic reforms, such as
worker representation on boards of directors or direct worker control of
production.
I am not optimistic about any of this. To begin with, I do not believe
that the educated classes provide a hopeful model about what to look forward
to when entire classes of people start to fancy themselves as policy experts.
I agree with William F. Buckley when he said that he would rather be
governed by the first 2,000 names in the Boston phone directory than by
the Harvard faculty.14 The well educated can become articulate and persuasive
without being wise, and the policies that academics have favored, from
socialism to affirmative action quotas, have produced poor consequences
without generating much contrition on the part of the academics who
sponsored them. Academia can be the ultimate echo chamber and its
members frighteningly susceptible to groupthink. In saying this, I am
not denying that there are genuine experts in the academy, many of whom
are indeed on the Harvard faculty. They are always our salvation. But,
we are more likely to select out their expertise by the slow process of
political parties looking for policies that work than by an entire class of
people believing themselves possessed of the wisdom to govern others.
As for labor unions, we should learn from experience. They are sold as
equalizing bargaining power between labor and capital. And they will in
fact accomplish that goal, given a particular capital complex that is already in
existence somehow. But the functions of capital, such as risk taking, patience,
and entrepreneurship, tend to precede those of labor. Unions can raise
wages without causing the plant to close, but it does not follow that the

11. See id. at 951.
12. See id. at 952.
13. Id. at 956.
14. Dan Wakefield, William F. Buckley, Jr.: Portrait of a Complainer, ESQUIRE,
Jan. 1961, at 49, 50 (“I would rather be governed by the first 2,000 people in the telephone
directory . . . than by the Harvard University faculty.”).
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investments that were made earlier in constructing the plant will therefore
earn a competitive risk adjusted return. If they do not, future investments
will be deterred, and the industrial base from which the workers are hoping
to be employed will shrink. Moreover, if workers receive their political
education from union activity, their first instinct will surely be to do even
more to enhance the short-run powers of labor to extract superior wages and
working conditions, even at the expense of long-run research and development
and capital formation.
Of course, the workers will learn their mistakes over the long run, as we
all do. I think it is ironic that democracy was often favored by its supporters,
and feared by its opponents, because it would lead to socialist economies.
And, indeed, it did so at first, until the consequences of socialism became
more and more evident. But one by one, countries that democratically created
socialist institutions have democratically turned away from them in considerable
part.15 That two-stage dynamic has occurred throughout the English-speaking
world, in England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and—to a lesser extent—
the United States, largely because the United States never went as far with
socialism as other countries did.16 The same two-stage dynamic has affected
much of Europe, including almost all of Scandinavia, as well as countries
as diverse as India and Israel.17 Probably it is largely for that reason that
so many academics have turned hostile to democracy. From my perspective,
however, it is a feather in the cap of democracy that it has a long-run ability
to shake off policies that sounded good but did not produce the results that
were promised.
In any event, I believe that democracy has been a reasonable success
not because any class of people, whether the wealthy, the educated, or the
workers, has been particularly wise or altruistic, but because democracy
builds in an accountability for results that helps steer a clumsy ship in a
forward direction over the long run.

15. See, e.g., F.R. Scott, Socialism in the Commonwealth, 1 INT’L J. 22, 23, 29 (1946).
16. See id.
17. See Maria Dakolias, Are We There Yet?: Measuring Success of Constitutional
Reform, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1117, 1205–06 (2006).
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